The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025 fundamentally restructures India’s nuclear governance and, with it, the treatment of nuclear-related inventions under the Patents Act, 1970. The Act repeals and subsumes two major legislations: the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which established a state monopoly over the sector, and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLNDA), which governed liability frameworks. In doing so, it consolidates what were previously fragmented, outdated, and overlapping regulations into a single, unified legal framework.

From Blanket Exclusion to Calibrated Patentability

Historically, section 4 of the Patents Act imposed a categorical bar on patents for inventions “relating to atomic energy,” by cross-referring to section 20(1) of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. In practice, this meant that many nuclear-adjacent applications; reactor systems, fuel cycles, and even inventions merely using listed materials, were routed to the Department of Atomic Energy, often leading to non-patentability or significant delay. The patents now may be granted for inventions relating to nuclear energy, but subject to section 38 of the SHANTI Act, which has become the new substantive filter.

SHANTI’s policy premise is expansion: India aims to scale nuclear capacity from the present 8.78 GW to 22.38 GW by 2031–32 and 100 GW by 2047, with enabling measures such as the Nuclear Energy Mission and support for small modular reactors (SMRs). This expansion requires private capital, technology transfer and a more predictable IP environment, which explains the move from a near-blanket exclusion to a more nuanced, security-screened patent regime.

Section 3(5) SHANTI: Government-Only Activities

Section 3(5) of the SHANTI Act reserves certain core fuel-cycle activities exclusively to the Central Government or its wholly-owned institutions. These include: enrichment or isotopic separation of prescribed or radioactive substances (unless otherwise notified); management of spent fuel, including reprocessing, recycling, radionuclide separation and high-level waste management; production and upgrading of heavy water by isotopic separation; and any other notified facilities or activities.

Even where private players can build, own and operate nuclear power plants, or fabricate fuel up to specified enrichment thresholds, these core domains remain sovereign. Any invention squarely directed to these reserved activities is doubly constrained: operationally reserved to Government and, under section 38, presumptively non-patentable.

Section 38 SHANTI and Patents Act Sections 4 and 65

Section 38 of SHANTI (Special provisions as to inventions) creates the new IP-control mechanism. The framework operates along three lines: (i) Patents may be granted for inventions “for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and radiation”; (ii) Inventions relating to activities reserved under section 3(5), or which the Government considers sensitive or having national security implications, are not patentable; (iii) Critically, the proviso to section 38(1) deems such sensitive inventions to have been “made or conceived” by the Central Government, effectively vesting rights in the State.

Third Schedule: Patent Amendments and Legislative Intent

The Third Schedule to the SHANTI Act contains the consequential amendments to other legislation. For patent practitioners, two amendments are directly material. First, section 4 of the Patents Act is fully substituted to read: “The patents may be granted for inventions relating to nuclear energy subject to the provisions of this Act and section 38 of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025.” Second, section 65(1) of the Patents Act is amended to replace the reference to “sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962” with “section 38 of the SHANTI Act, 2025,” updating the post-grant revocation trigger to align with the new legislative framework.

The Statement of Objects and Reasons underlying the Act is equally instructive for understanding the policy environment in which these patent amendments will operate. Its stated objectives include: achieving 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 and energy independence with a decarbonisation roadmap by 2070; enabling active private sector participation alongside the public sector; conferring statutory status on the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB); facilitating innovation in nuclear science and expanding non-power applications in healthcare, agriculture and industry; and exempting R&D activities from licensing requirements. Read together, these objects signal that the patent amendments in the Third Schedule are not incidental, they are part of a deliberate policy to make nuclear technology commercially and innovatively viable in India for the first time, with IP protection as a prerequisite for attracting the private capital and global partnerships the programme requires.

Section 65 of the Patents Act remains a powerful back-end safety valve: if the Central Government is satisfied, at any time after grant, that a patent is for an invention relating to nuclear energy for which no patent can be granted under the governing nuclear law, it may direct the Controller to revoke the patent. For practitioners, this creates a two-stage filter: an ex-ante screening under section 38 of SHANTI Act and section 4 of the Patents Act during examination, and an ex-post revocation risk under section 65 if security or policy assessments evolve.

Beyond its regulatory restructuring, the SHANTI Act is fundamentally an economic enabler. By opening nuclear technology to licensed private investment, creating a predictable IP environment through the reformed Section 4, and targeting 100 GW by 2047, it positions the technology as a long-term industrial competitiveness strategy. Nuclear power delivers stable, carbon-free baseload electricity for 40–60 years with minimal geopolitical fuel risk, and private participation finally creates a credible pathway to scale it. The reformed patent regime is equally significant: by removing the blanket Section 4 bar, the Act incentivises domestic R&D and IP filing in nuclear and radiation technologies for the first time, giving India the legal architecture to convert its considerable technical expertise into commercialisable, exportable intellectual property. If implemented with clear regulations and consistent practice, these changes could meaningfully accelerate India’s path to energy security while building a durable indigenous nuclear IP ecosystem over the next two decades.

By
Priya Krishnan